For example, if someone helps a person who shoots in the water, it shows his morale. There does not seem to be any difference between law and morality. Greek writers, he quotes, suggest that the good man is the one who will do what is permitted. It is the legislators of these early societies who determine what is right and what is wrong. What should be legal is roughly what is really right or just, that is, what we would call morally just. We find, for example, the distinction between what is legally or conventionally just and what is naturally or morally right. Sometimes this is expressed as a contrast between what the gods command (i.e. what is morally right) and what the political authorities command (i.e. what is legally just). The knowledge of what is just or moral, and the ability to distinguish true justice or morality from what is only ostensibly just, depend on the full development and use of human reason.
Forward from the relationship of morality to the law that binds judges, to the relationship of morality to the content of what should be the law in a liberal and democratic state. It thus moves from the judicial role to the legislative role. Legislators, no less than judges, need a theory of their role, a theory of what is right and what is not, that can be sought through legislation. A legislature should simply accurately reflect the views of its constituents, regardless of those views in relation to the new law that is to be created. But where do we find a theory of the right legislative objectives? The obvious answer for Moore is «morality.» If a judge has no obvious right at his disposal, morality is mentioned. Mill believed that one of the forbidden goals for legislators in a liberal democracy was to enshrine morality in law. Only legislation to prevent behaviour harmful to others is adequate; Laws promoting morality are condemned, as are paternalistic laws. Example: The state should not force or promote a moral idea of the good life; or the State should abandon laws on moral issues where there is no overlap of consensus; or the state should provide only the equitable framework in which different moral visions can compete; etc. The critique of Mill and these post-millimanian liberalisms is very simple. If something is morally good, it gives each of us a reason to promote its realization.
This applies to the legislator as well as to any other person. If laws can be passed to promote justice, there are good reasons to do so. Their degree of liberality depends on the structure of morality that they would translate into laws. If this morality contains such things as a general right to liberty, then a moralistic legislator should also respect this part of morality. Mill`s principle of damages is not a limitation of the actual legislative objective, but a theory of when the conduct is morally wrong. Most violations committed by others without their consent are morally reprehensible, and most grave immoral injustices involve causing such harm. According to Moore, Austin was right when he thought we should legislate morality. The law we should have should be as morally correct as possible. But Moore can be criticized here if he supports morality legislation, which is virtually impossible. These are situations that may be good for the law, but bad for morality and vice versa. Positivism Legal theory: According to this theory, the right of sovereign authority is common.
A commandment of men for other people, where the previous one is more powerful and stronger than the others and enjoys the status of power and authority of the legislator, is undeniable, and after the question of the law, he will decide what is right and what is wrong, and if one does not obey the law, There will be a punishment. Jeremy Bentham believed that the law of the first positivist should be based on human experience. Positive law could set the standard for both required and prohibited actions. Historical case in which the conflict between law and morality can be understood. According to natural law theory, any grossly unjust law that violates moral norms is not a law at all. This means that law and morality are closely linked. The term «natural law» itself comes from the idea that human morality comes from nature and takes the form of rules and regulations in a society. Legal theorists who supported the theory of natural law included Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Lon Fuller, and others. Morality had evolved long before the emergence of the concept of law. You can see that in ancient times, people blindly believed in moral practices and diligently followed them; However, with the development of state laws, morality took a back seat.
Throughout history, no clear distinction has been made between law and morality. Due to a lack of distinction, all laws originated in what was considered morally correct by people in a society. Eventually, the state took what was morally correct and gave it the form of laws or rules and regulations. Therefore, the law originates and is based on the values that float among people and create a similarity between the two concepts, i.e. law and morality. For example, it is morally wrong to kill or rape someone. This value took the form of a law. Morality may have been distinguished by laws over time, but it remains an integral part of legal development. The law essentially contains certain fundamental principles, such as the principle of fairness and equality, and these principles derive from ethics and morality. So it`s out of the way. We know that we must be moral, and that others should do the same, and without some sense of morality, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for many people to live together. Let us now turn to the questions that deal with the rules of morality and all the rules that govern human behavior.
First of all, some terms need to be clarified. The Hart-Fuller debate is one of the most interesting exchanges of ideas and opinions between Lon Fuller and H. L. To the fascinating interdependence between law and morality. This was published in the Harvard Law Review in 1958 and essentially highlighted the difference of opinion between positivist philosophy and natural law philosophy.